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Abstract
The court unification movement has progressed in fits and starts over the de-
cades. Recent proposals have been put forth that attempt to continue the move 
toward a state court structure that utilizes a more coherent approach to gover-
nance. Drawing on a survey of court personnel who were asked about a set of 
proposed governance principles, this article examines how state court judges 
and administrators view their roles and responsibilities in the court system, the 
current need for court reform, the importance of future trends, and whether 
they are confident in the performance of their respective court system. Three 
hundred and seventy-five judges and administrators answered sixty-two ques-
tions regarding principles governing state court procedures and measures of 
their confidence in the court system. Participants overwhelmingly agreed that 
changes in court governance are necessary, although the degree of change for 
specific principles and trends was moderated by career, age, and time work-
ing for the courts. Results indicate that perceptions of court performance are 
not uniform among court professionals, perhaps signifying that current court 
governance emphases should be reexamined. 
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Debate on the most effective model for organizing state court systems continues. The long-
standing movement among states to unify their courts in order to increase public satisfaction 
and court performance generated reforms in many states but largely lost steam by the mid-
1980s. A recent review of the unification agenda (Rottman 2008) found that only one-third of 
the states have a court system that conforms closely to the original unification model as pro-
posed by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1974. That proportion shows little advance 
in court unification in the last twenty years (Flango and Rottman 1992). One reason for the in-
complete adoption of the unification agenda is the lack of persuasive empirical evidence to 
show that achieving unification provides an advantage in either increasing public satisfaction 
with courts (Mahoney, Sarat, and Weller 1978) or making courts more effective (Rottman and 
Hewitt 1996). 
While there is no consensus on the best way to organize state court systems, new ideas are 
emerging that reject a one-size-fits-all approach and seek to allow each state to find the most 
effective form of governance for its needs and circumstances. This article tests the appeal of 
one such approach now currently receiving considerable attention in the state court commu-
nity. This approach, advocated by Christine Durham and Dan Becker (2010),1 advances general 
principles for court governance that are applicable to any court system, regardless of its level 
of unification. The approach emerged from a three-year Harvard Kennedy School of Govern-
ment “Executive Session for State Court Leaders in the 21st Century,” and it follows a model 
the Kennedy School previously applied to policing, prosecution, and defenders as a way to 
solve the impasses associated with traditional practices.2 
The 2010 survey of judges and court administrators that forms the basis of this article, how-
ever, offers a more comprehensive look at what judges think about issues related to the unifi-
cation agenda, in addition to adding the voices of court administrators. Specifically, we ana-
lyze the survey responses to answer three basic questions relevant to court reform: First, how 
satisfied are contemporary judges and administrators with the status quo in terms of how they 
are governed? Second, which court functions are seen as best performed locally at the trial 
court level, and which functions require authoritative guidance from a centralized adminis-
tration? Third, are there significant differences in perspectives on court reform between judges 
and administrators or by career length? 
In this way, our assessment of the Durham and Becker (2010) principles and of the general 
views of court insiders toward aspects of unification follows in a tradition of assessing court 
reform based on the perceptions and preferences of court insiders (Berkson 1980; Mahoney et 
al. 1978; Scheb 1990), rather than or in addition to those of the general public. While our anal-
ysis provides feedback on the response to the Durham and Becker principles, our principal 
concern is to provide analysis relevant to our research questions about how satisfied judges 
and administrators are with the organization of their state’s courts, whether court insiders 
1. Christine Durham is currently a member of the Utah Supreme Court (serving as chief justice between 2002 and 2012) and 
Dan Becker is the Utah state court administrator. Both were members of the Executive Session for State Court Leaders 
in the 21st century.
2. An Executive Session brings together individuals of independent standing who take joint responsibility for rethinking 
and improving society’s response to an issue. For a description of the Executive Session and the resulting “New Perspec-
tives in Court Leadership” paper series, see http://www.hks.harvard.edu/programs/criminaljustice/research-publica-
tions/executive-sessions/esstatecourts. The Executive Session was funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the 
State Justice Institute.
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agree on which functions should be a local responsibility, and whether there are patterns in 
responses that distinguish judges from administrators or relatively new versus long-serving 
court insiders. 
First, we examine judge and court administrator attitudes regarding how courts should 
work, in contrast to how courts currently work, in relation to the ten principles. This analysis of 
whether a gap in the perceptions of court personnel regarding the ways in which courts should 
work and how they actually do work is important for identifying whether there is a perceived 
need for new governing principles, such as the ones outlined by Durham and Becker (2010). 
Second, we examine attitudes regarding which features of state court governance should be 
located at the central level and which at the local level, a key question that has not been stud-
ied. Third, we also examine whether any gap between one’s ideal view of the courts and how 
they believe the courts actually work varies as a function of factors such as age and length of 
time in their current career. Finally, we return to our examination of the gaps in perceptions 
of judges and court administrators to determine whether such gaps might have a relationship 
to the confidence that court personnel have in the ability of state courts to carry out important 
court functions. We conclude by discussing our findings in the context of Durham and Beck-
er’s proposed governance principles and the current status of court reform. 
Taken together, these analyses provide a unique look at the views and opinions of court 
personnel who work within the context of current court governance structures. In conjunction 
with the writing of Durham and Becker (2010), we believe this article allows for an opportu-
nity for practitioners to take stock of the current attitudes of state court personnel as we look 
forward to potential trends, especially as state governments continue to operate in an age of 
relative austerity. If institutional reforms are indeed on the horizon, as seems likely (National 
Center for State Courts 2011), this article will help provide a baseline understanding of the cur-
rent status of court reform in the United States. 
 
 
The Unification Agenda and How it is Viewed by Court Insiders 
 
The unification agenda called for implementing four principles intended to create unified 
state court systems that would be better able to manage themselves, protect their interests, 
maintain independence from the other branches of government, and increase public satis-
faction with the courts. Groups such as the ABA and the American Judicature Society advo-
cated for unification as a solution to what ailed the state courts, abetted by significant fund-
ing support from the U.S. Department of Justice. The prevailing standards were established 
by the ABA (1974/1990). States court systems were to be reformed by (1) simplifying their 
organizational structure by consolidating trial courts, (2) centralizing management and per-
sonnel policies, (3) replacing local court funding with a single centralized judiciary bud-
get, and (4) centralizing rule-making authority in the state supreme court. The standards ac-
knowledged, but largely ignored, the implications for achieving unification and, in many 
states, the political, legal, and other realities making unification unachievable and perhaps 
undesirable. 
The unification agenda therefore progressed unevenly across the country, with most of 
the associated changes to court structure occurring in the initial decade of those efforts. By 
the mid- 1970s, skepticism about the generalizability and even the wisdom of this agenda 
(Gallas 1976; Lipscher and Conti 1991) was commonplace. The limited research undertaken 
4    K i m b r o u g h  e t  a l .  i n  J u s t i c e  s y s t e m  J o u r n a l  35 (2014) 
to find evidence for the benefits of unification was disappointing to advocates. In particular, 
the expectations of reformers were shaken when a special analysis of a 1977 national survey 
found no differences between the perceptions of their courts by residents in three states with 
a long history of court reform and three states “with traditional orientations” (Mahoney et 
al. 1978). 
The benefits of unification also were not apparent in the field research on the topic. One 
study of trial courts in four states with varying levels of unification concluded that there was 
some relationship between the level of unification and court performance (as assessed both 
by the courtroom work group and local leaders in the legal and local government commu-
nity), giving a slight advantage to trial courts in unified systems, but nonetheless concluded: 
“court unification, in and of itself, is not necessarily associated with higher levels of court per-
formance” (Rottman and Hewitt 1996, 82). Locally determined factors, such as the method for 
making judicial assignments, were found to be more important. 
For the most part, assessments of unification relied on surveys of the general public, lead-
ing one researcher to express concern that “[c]onspicuosuly absent from the numerous articles 
on court reform are studies of judges’ attitudes toward important reform issues” (Scheb 1990, 
17). To date, only a small research literature on judges’ attitudes to court reform exists, most of 
which dates back to the period in which the unification agenda was advancing. First, the 1977 
Public Image of the Courts survey was extended to include separate samples of judges, law-
yers, and community leaders. As with the general public, members of these groups did not re-
port greater confidence in the courts of “unified” states, although there was greater awareness 
that reforms associated with unification had been implemented there. Judges also varied in 
the perceived need for reform: 40 percent reported a “great” or “moderate” need for reform, 
while another 27 percent believed “some reform” was needed (Mahoney et al. 1978, 86). The 
remainder saw no need for reform. 
In a national survey of probate judges, Berkson (1980) found a split in views about the de-
sirability of unification, with only 44 percent of probate judges supporting unification. These 
supporters viewed “greater prestige” and “salaries more equitable” as consequences bene-
fiting themselves, but they were also overwhelmingly persuaded that the public would be 
better served and taxpayers would save from unification. Another national survey focused 
on the perceptions of appellate judges (Scheb 1990). This 1987 survey once again found a 
lack of consensus on the value of court consolidation, a central plank of the reform agenda, 
with 55 percent of appellate judges agreeing that consolidation was beneficial and with 22 
percent disagreeing, leaving 23 percent “not sure.” The only subsequent survey-based as-
sessment of court reform by court insiders is the one analyzed in the present article (Dur-
ham and Becker 2010). 
 
The Durham and Becker Principles for State Court Governance 
 
The initial meetings of the Executive Session for State Court Leaders in the 21st Century 
identified tensions between local and centralized decision-makers as a key problem facing the 
state courts. This led Executive Session members Utah Chief Justice Christine Durham and 
Utah state court administrator Dan Becker to urge state courts to reevaluate traditional meth-
ods of managing courts so that contemporary problems can be addressed. They set forth ten 
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principles by which courts should be governed in an attempt to jumpstart a national debate 
on how potentially outdated methods might be modernized to meet current and future chal-
lenges (Durham and Becker 2010).3 
There are several notable features of their principles. First, they are designed to apply to 
all state court systems regardless of their level of unification. Second, the principles focus on 
the internal operations of the courts rather than external perceptions of the courts or relations 
with outside entities: 
The principles were developed by examining what courts, as institutions, need to do inter-
nally, to meet their responsibilities. This is in contrast to much of the current writing about the 
future of court governance, which considers ways in which the state courts can improve their 
relationship with the other branches of government. (Durham and Becker 2010, 1) 
As such, Durham and Becker’s (2010) ten court management principles represent one of the 
most recent and comprehensive set of recommendations currently being advocated by court 
experts.4 The principles promoted by Durham and Becker reflect a general conclusion that 
while specific organizational features such as full unification may influence the administration 
and efficiency of justice (Dahlin 1993; Nelson 2001), it is, perhaps, more important for courts 
to simply to have a coherent set of policies in place (Henderson and Kerwin 1983). Given that 
judges and administrators develop and carry out such policies, it is critical to understand how 
these individuals perceive their applicability and their state’s progress toward adopting a co-
herent set of policies. At the same time, our analysis of those attitudes can be used to provide 
answers to questions about satisfaction with how state courts are governed and where the line 
should be drawn between local and central responsibilities. 
The Durham and Becker (2010) principles are meant not as a rigid collection of rules, but in-
stead as a starting point that can and should be adapted to fit the needs of individual court sys-
tems, however those might be defined. Indeed, as Durham and Becker note, court culture—the 
expectations, practices, and informal rules of courts (Church, Carlson, Lee, and Tan 1978)—is 
a critical determinant of the success of structural reforms (Ostrom and Hanson 2010). Impor-
tantly, several of the principles (e.g., transparency, voice) are grounded in procedural justice, 
a theory from social psychology that explains how members of the public define the elements 
of far decision-making (e.g., Tyler 1990). Procedural justice has been shown to be an important 
element of properly functioning courts (Burke and Leben 2008; Rottman and Tomkins 1999). 
Before moving to a description of our analytic approach, we briefly list and expand on each of 
the ten court principles put forth by Durham and Becker. 
 
3. See note 1. 
4. Since the mid-1970s, a number of models for court reform have been advanced based on theories of organization. These 
include contingency theory, TQM (total quality management), and organizational culture (Ostrom and Hanson 2010). For 
a partial summary of these approaches, see Rottman (2010). Their application, however, has been focused on the level of 
the trial court, not the state court system. The Durham and Becker contribution, by contrast, is focused on reforming state 
court systems by adopting a set of principles in a manner appropriate for the individual state. The Executive Session for 
State Court Leaders produced two other approaches to state-level court reform. Former Phoenix, Arizona presiding judge 
Barbara Mundell and Texas Chief Justice Wallace Jefferson (2012) contributed ideas on reconciling local and central in-
terests in court governance and National Center for State Courts president Mary McQueen applies loosely-coupled or-
ganization theory to urge courts to look to hospitals and universities, not other government units or corporations, as the 
guide to court reform (2013). All of these new approaches stress flexibility and the impossibility of any set of standards 
that can be applied uncritically in the vast majority of states. 
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• Principle 1: “A well-defined governance structure for policy formulation and adminis-
tration for the entire court system.” Despite the call for the unification of court systems 
in the 1970s and 1980s, Durham and Becker show that many jurisdictions still lack a cen-
tral authority, possibly due to an absence of consensus that full unification is the logi-
cal goal for all court systems. 
• Principle 2: “Meaningful input from all court levels into the decision-making process.” 
Durham and Becker emphasize that input from all levels of the court system brings two 
essential elements to the decision-making process. First, the variety of novel ideas and 
knowledge is enhanced. Second, if the constituents of each system feel they do not have 
a say in the decision-making process, they have the potential to lose faith in the system, 
resulting in apathy or outright resistance. 
• Principle 3: “A system that speaks with a single voice.” A unified voice while dealing 
with the public and other branches of government is necessary to reflect institutional in-
dependence and equality, as well as to garner the respect the courts deserve. 
• Principle 4: “Selection of judicial leadership based on competency, not seniority or ro-
tation.” Durham and Becker suggest a more thoughtful approach to leadership selec-
tion and training, expanding on traditional methods that focus on seniority or rotation. 
• Principle 5: “Commitment to transparency and accountability.” Parallel with the ongo-
ing calls for transparency within the federal government, Durham and Becker argue that 
for state courts to justify institutional independence, they must also be open with how 
they utilize public resources. 
• Principle 6: “Authority to allocate resources and spend appropriated funds indepen-
dent of the legislative and executive branches.” By allowing courts to monitor and allo-
cate their own resources, they would have the independence to manage funds without 
being influenced by the third-party agendas of the legislative and executive branches. 
• Principle 7: “A focus on policy level issues; delegation with clarity to administrative 
staff; and a commitment to evaluation.” By assigning policy decisions to structural 
heads of the judicial system and the more day-to-day tasks to administrative staff, state 
courts can improve operating efficiency. In addition, Durham and Becker emphasize ev-
idence-based evaluations of all new policies. 
• Principle 8: “Open communication on decisions and how they are reached.” Without 
influencing or instructing judges on how to make their decisions, Durham and Becker 
suggest a more open environment of communication toward the public. Previous re-
search indicates that allowing the public to better understand the process that goes into 
a judge’s decision will lead to higher levels of satisfaction, regardless of the outcome 
(Tyler 1990). 
• Principle 9: “Positive institutional relationships that foster trust among other branches 
and constituencies.” To maintain good working relationships with outside entities that 
are often responsible for allocating funds, the judicial branch should pursue account-
ability and constant improvement within the state court system. By advocating continu-
ing judicial education and performance evaluations for judges and other key court per-
sonnel, the judicial branch can be proactive in demonstrating credibility. 
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• Principle 10: “Clearly established relationships among the governing entity, presiding 
judges, court administrators, boards of judges, and court committees.” The last princi-
ple underscores the importance of having clearly defined roles within an organization. 
Without a proper understanding of who is responsible for what, any system would 
quickly suffer.5 
 
Method 
 
To conduct our analysis, we utilized the data collected from an online survey distributed to 
members of eleven different state court-related organizations prior to the 4th National Sym-
posium on Court Management. The survey instrument was developed in conjunction with 
a paper to be presented by Durham and Becker at that symposium and anticipation of spe-
cific issues likely to come under scrutiny. Prior to the symposium, the online survey was sent 
to the e-mail addresses of 1,766 members of the organizations; 369 (21 percent) participants 
responded. Respondents were composed of 151 state trial or appellate court judges (hereaf-
ter, “judges”), as well as 213 state court administrators and staff (hereafter, “administrators”). 
Five respondents did not specify their position. Table 1 lists the eleven organizations, as well 
as the number of participants in each. Participants answered sixty-two questions total. These 
questions, using seven-point scales, included evaluations of the ten principles, with partici-
pants first rating how important they thought it was that courts in their state should follow each 
5. The 2010 version of the Durham and Becker paper put forward ten principles for court governance, which were used to 
design the online survey. Subsequently, when revising the paper for publication in the New Perspectives on State Court 
Leadership paper series, the authors added an eleventh principle: “The judicial branch should govern and administer op-
erations that are core to the process of adjudication” (Durham and Becker 2012, 6). This refers, in part, to the situation in 
some states where the ownership and maintenance of the court record lies with an entity outside of the judicial branch. 
This and other papers in the “New Perspectives” series can be accessed at www.ncsc.org/hes. 
Table 1. Participant Organizations
Organization   Number of Participants  % of Participants
American Judges Assoc.   77  20.9
Conf. of Chief Justices   21   5.7
Conf. of Court Public Info. Officers   16   4.3
Conf. of State Court Admins.   33   8.9
Council/Chief Judges/State Courts of Appeal   17   4.6
Cons. for Lang. Access in the Courts   6   1.6
Judicial Family Institute   5   1.4
Natl. Assoc. for Court Mgmt.  157  41.5
Natl. Assoc. of Women Judges   81  22.0
Natl. Cons./Race/Ethnic Fairness/Courts   16   4.3
Natl. Conf. of Appellate Court Clerks   9   2.4
Natl. Conf. of Metro. Courts   6   1.6
Natl. Conf. of Probate Judges   9   2.4
None of the above   24   6.5
Frequencies may not add up to 369, as some participants did not respond and some were members of
multiple organizations.
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principle, then rating how they thought their state’s courts currently follow those principles. 
In addition, participants gave their opinions by rating 1) a series of court functions to indicate 
where they felt those functions would best be controlled (i.e., at the state or local level), 2) fu-
ture trends in the state court system,6 and 3) their confidence in state courts and judges (e.g., 
“Most judges in my state do their job well”). Finally, participants provided demographic in-
formation (e.g., age, gender, years in current career position). 
 
 
Results 
 
Is vs. Should Be 
 
We first examined the opinions of the court personnel (both judges and court administra-
tors) regarding attitudes toward current governing structures, in relation to how they felt 
governing structures should be. The findings of that analysis are presented in Table 2. As the 
results show, court personnel were most convinced that a well-defined structure for court oper-
ations is currently in place (M = 4.64). It is important to keep in mind, however, that although 
it rated the highest compared to the other principles, it still rated near the middle of the scale, 
indicating that participants did not view any of the principles as well-established in the cur-
rent way of organizing and managing a state court system. Conversely, court personnel were 
least agreeable to the notion that courts currently have the authority to allocate resources (M = 
3.68). Thus, while court personnel moderately agree that a well-defined governing structure 
is in place, they clearly see a lack of authority over court resources. With regard to which gov-
erning principles should be used, court personnel were most likely to agree that courts should 
6. Data regarding opinions about future trends was not included in the following results, as it was beyond the scope of the 
current article. 
Table 2. Mean Ratings of Principle Utilization
  Is Currently Utilized    Should Be Utilized
Principle   Judges  Admin  Total   Judges  Admin  Total
1. A Well-Defined Structure  4.84  4.51  4.64  5.87  6.12  6.04
2. Meaningful Input  3.86  3.93  3.94  6.36  6.29  6.32
3. Speaks with Single Voice 4.23  4.07  4.16  5.10  5.43  5.31
4. Competent Leadership Selection  3.94  3.97  3.94  6.04  6.36  6.26
5. Commitment to Transparency  4.47  4.69  4.64  6.44  6.53  6.51
6. Authority to Allocate Resources  3.56  3.73  3.68  6.44  6.12  6.25
7. Focus, Delegation, Commitment  4.61  4.62  4.62  5.86  6.18  6.09
8. Open Communication  3.73  4.01  3.89  6.09  6.09  6.08
9. Positive Inst. Relationships  4.17  4.41  4.35  6.39  6.45  6.43
10. Clearly Established Relationships  4.24  4.48  4.39  6.35  6.43  6.39
Ratings range from 1 to 7, with 7 indicating higher agreement that the principle is currently, or should be, 
embraced in the participant’s court system. All mean differences between “is” and “should be” are significant 
(t-tests > 9.95, p <.001).
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have a commitment to transparency (M = 6.54), positive institutional relationships (M = 6.43), and 
clearly established relationships (M = 6.39). Alternatively, court personnel were least likely to 
agree that courts need to speak with a single voice (M = 5.31). 
To determine where the greatest gaps existed between perceptions of the current status of 
court governance and the greatest needs for future directions of state court governance, we 
conducted paired-sample t-tests to evaluate whether significant differences existed between 
how court members believed the ten principles were currently utilized and how those prin-
ciples should ideally be utilized. An appraisal of the results reveals a clear discrepancy be-
tween how court members believe the system should work and how they believe it actually 
does work. In every comparison, a significant difference existed, with participants consistently 
indicating that the recommended principles are not presently implemented as much as they 
should be (all t-tests > 9.95, p < .001). 
Specifically, the results of that analysis demonstrated that the greatest gap existed with re-
gard to the courts’ authority to allocate resources, with a 2.57 mean difference. Recall that, of the 
ten governing principles, judges and administrators were least likely to say that courts cur-
rently adhere to this governing principle. The fact that such a difference exists suggests that 
judges and administrators are currently dissatisfied with the courts’ control over resources and 
view control over resources as an extremely important ideal that clearly has not been reached. 
The next largest difference existed for the second principle, “Meaningful input from all court 
levels in the decision-making process.” Here, there was a 2.38 mean difference in the percep-
tion of courts’ current utilization of this principle in relation to its ideal utilization. The small-
est mean difference existed on the speaks with a single voice principle, where there was only a 
1.15 mean difference in the perception of courts current utilization of this principle in relation 
to its ideal utilization. 
 
Individual Differences 
 
Because there was a general pattern that indicated most participants believed the ten prin-
ciples should be embraced at a greater level than they currently are, we sought to understand 
whether those discrepancies varied as a function of the respondent’s career type (judges vs. 
administrators), length in current career, and age. In order to explore these discrepancies, 
we used the mean difference scores (should be vs. currently is) as a proxy indicator of how 
strongly a participant felt a change should be made in the application of a certain principle. We 
then compared these scores across each of the aforementioned variables. 
Judges (Mean age = 57.27) in our sample tended to be older than administrators (Mean age 
= 52.79), t(332)=5.13, p<.001. Conversely, administrators had been in their current career lon-
ger than judges (20.39 years vs. 17.65 years, respectively), t(350) = 2.41, p < .05. Respondents’ 
difference scores varied for some of the principles as a function of career type (i.e., judges ver-
sus court administrators), length in current career, and age. With regard to type of career, court 
administrators reported a greater difference than judges between current application and ideal 
application of a well-defined court structure (Principle 1), t(336) = 3.04, p < .01, and the impor-
tance of all departments and branches of government speaking with a single voice (Principle 
3), t(337) = 2.33, p < .05. The findings suggest that compared to judges, court administrators 
view a greater gap between the actual and ideal governance of the courts. This difference could 
be due to a proximity difference between the two groups, where administrators spend more 
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time and deal more closely with these matters than judges and thus see where improvements 
can be made and how such a structure can be beneficial compared to current conditions. In ad-
dition, there was a marginally significant gap between how judges perceived the ideal and ac-
tual independent authority to allocate resources and spend appropriated funding compared 
to (Principle 6), t(344) = 1.78, p = .077. This finding suggests that judges may be more attuned 
to the fiscal side of state court operations, where courts have traditionally not been afforded 
the same budgetary autonomy as have the other branches of government. 
We next conducted Pearson correlations between length of time working for state courts 
at their current position and opinion difference scores to examine how such exposure to the 
court system might influence opinions of each principle (see Table 3). Correlations were sig-
nificantly negative for four principles, and they approached significance on a fifth. This in-
dicates that for all significant correlations, the longer participants had been working for the 
courts, the less important a change in each principle became. Independent authority to allocate 
funds (Principle 6) showed the strongest correlation (r =−.15, p < .01), indicating that although 
many of these correlations were significant, the cohort effect sizes were relatively small. How-
ever, some correlations were dependent on who responded. For example, court administra-
tors who had been working for state courts longer indicated lesser need for change in a well-
defined structure (Principle 1). In contrast, judges’ need for change was unrelated to how long 
they had been serving. A similar pattern emerged for Principle 4, which states that leader-
ship should be based on competency, not seniority. Administrators showed less of a need for 
change the longer they had been working for state courts, but judges’ need for change was un-
related to years on the bench. 
Finally, we examined correlations between age and ideal/actual difference scores. Anal-
yses indicated that the pattern of correlations was roughly the same as for time working for 
courts; the correlations were all in the negative direction, indicating the possible existence of 
Table 3. Need for Governance Change Correlations with Age/Career Length
                                                                                Years at Current Career                               Age
Principle   Judges      Admin       Total       Judges      Admin        Total
1. A Well-Defined Structure    .015  −.218**  −.101  −.163  −.159*  −.190**
2. Meaningful Input  −.122  −.158*  −.147**  −.132  −.078  −.078
3. Speaks with Single Voice  −.002    .012    .019  −.174*  −.079  −.146**
4. Competent Leadership Selection   .057  −.144*  −.054  −.155  −.077  −.138*
5. Commitment to Transparency  −.112  −.107  −.115*  −.101  −.045  −.073
6. Authority to Allocate Resources  −.112  −.158*  −.150**  −.207*  −.054  −.063
7. Focus, Delegation, Commitment  −.045  −.116  −.078  −.249**  −.119  −.182**
8. Open Communication  −.008  −.124  −.088  −.140  −.070  −.079
9. Positive Inst. Relationships  −.129  −.096  −.112*  −.221*  −.068  −.107
10. Clearly Established Relationships  −.002  −.045  −.034  −.155  −.113  −.110*
Average across all Principles  −.006  −.130  −.071  −.170*  −.164*  −.168**
Negative correlations indicate that older participants, or those who have been at their current position longer, 
reported smaller differences between how courts are currently governed and how they should be governed. 
Bolded correlations are statistically significant. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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a generational gap in perceptions of the need for change, with long-term veterans perceiving 
less need for change. A well-defined structure had the strongest correlation with age (r = −.19, p 
< .01). Again, however, some correlations were entirely dependent on career type. The need 
for a change in Principle 3 (speaks with a single voice) decreased with age for judges, but it re-
mained constant for administrators. The same was true for Principles 6 (authority to allocate re-
sources), 7 (focus, delegation, commitment), and 9 (positive institutional relationships). On average, 
however, both judges and administrators indicated less need for change in principle imple-
mentation the longer they had served in the courts. 
In summary, the findings just reported indicate considerable dissatisfaction with the way 
in which courts are organized and governed. While the dissatisfaction relates especially to the 
Durham/Becker principles, the questions refer to fundamental dimensions of court reform: a 
well-defined structure and authority to allocate resources. The gap between what is and what 
should be utilized is among the largest identified. There were also some points at which per-
ceptions of court governance differed based on whether the respondent is a judge or an ad-
ministrator and the length of time they have worked in the courts. 
 
Distribution of Functions: Local vs. Central 
 
As noted above, there is a controversy in the state court world about the desirability 
of completing the old court reform agenda that sought unification (Mundell and Jefferson 
2012). That agenda is at very different levels of implementation. There is no apparent con-
sensus on which court functions should be entirely or primarily carried out locally and 
which functions should be primarily or entirely the responsibility of a central court admin-
istration. To add information to the ongoing debate, we therefore examined attitudes toward 
centralized control over court administration by looking at how participants rated eight spe-
cific functions as to whether they are better performed at the local level or at the state level. 
These functions included judicial assignments, budget preparation, human resources, legislative li-
aison, public information, research, selection of trial court presiding judges (sometimes called chief 
or administrative judges), and major policy decisions. The complete distribution of ratings can 
be found in Table 4. 
Court insiders rated judicial assignments, human resources, and the selection of trial court 
presiding judges as better performed at a local level and legislative liaison, research, and ma-
jor policy decisions as better served at the state level. Budget preparation and public informa-
tion were evenly distributed, with the majority of participants believing that these functions 
can be served at either level. It is important to note, however, that although some functions 
(e.g., human resources, legislative liaison) leaned one way or another, a large portion of partic-
ipants responded that these functions could be performed at either level. The lack of consensus 
on these matters is confirmed. We are unable because of our sample size to analyze whether 
preferences of this kind vary from state to state or differ based on the extent to which a state’s 
courts have been unified. But the basic message is clear: There are few “unifiers” among the 
judges and court administrators we surveyed. 
Although administrators and judges tended to agree in their responses, they differed on 
the strength of that opinion for five of the eight functions. Judges rated judicial assignments, 
research, and selection of trial court presiding judges as best performed locally, as opposed 
to at the state level, compared to administrators. Conversely, administrators rated budget 
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preparation and public information as best performed at the local level, instead of the state 
level, compared to judges. This suggests that today support for a key component of a unified 
court system is lacking generally, but especially for administrators. Some caution is needed, 
however, when analyzing these results. Although the strength of opinion is significantly dif-
ferent between judges and administrators for these five functions, the overall opinion itself 
was often similar. For example, both administrators and judges tended to view judicial assign-
ments as best decided locally, but while administrator rating was only slightly in that direc-
tion, judges were clearly leaning in that direction. Alternatively, when considering selection 
of trial court presiding judges, administrators tended to rate this function slightly in the state 
level direction, whereas judges tended to rate it slightly in the local direction. 
Although career type influenced the locality of function performance to a degree, length of 
time in current career was not as strong a predictor. Only two functions, human resources (r = 
.12, p < .05) and research (r = .17, p < .01), were significantly predicted. In both cases, the longer 
participants had been employed in their current career, the more likely they were to see these 
functions best performed at the state level. 
Finally, age turned out to be correlated with what level respondents believed functions 
should be performed. The older respondents were, the more likely they were to believe that 
budget preparation, human resources, legislative liaison, public information, and major policy deci-
sions should be decided at the state level (lowest r = .16, p < .01). Follow-up regression analy-
ses were conducted, and this effect remained regardless of whether respondents were judges 
or administrators. 
In summary, the findings reveal continuing controversy on the issue of which functions and 
decision-making responsibilities are best left to local trial courts and which are best carried 
out from a central perspective. For all functions, the overall average was toward the midpoint 
of the scale used, even for functions such as budget preparation, which the conventional wis-
dom argued needed to be a centralized function, and even for selection of presiding judges. 
Judges and administrators differed in their assessment of the best location for five of the eight 
functions considered. 
Table 4. Preferred Locality of Court Functions
Court Function                                               Judges                            Administrators                                     All
Judicial Assignments*  2.08  2.36  2.24
Budget Preparation*  3.01  2.73  2.85
Human Resources  2.66  2.47  2.55
Legislative Liaison  3.71  3.73  3.71
Public Information*  3.18  2.92  3.03
Research**  3.01  3.45  3.27
Select/Trial Court Presiding Judges*  2.31  2.65  2.52
Major Policy Decisions  3.48  3.29  3.37
Ratings range from 1 to 5, with lower ratings indicating that functions are best performed at the local 
level, while higher numbers indicate functions are best performed at the state level. Bolded functions are 
significantly different between judges and administrators. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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Confidence in State Courts 
 
Finally, participants rated their confidence in state courts as well as various matters of judge 
and court performance. Judges (M = 5.74) rated their overall confidence, on a scale from 1 to 
7, in the court system of their respective states significantly higher than court administrators 
(M = 5.40), t(333) = 2.80, p < .01. All significant differences regarding specific areas of judge 
and court performance revealed that judges had greater confidence in the court system than 
administrators, with the greatest difference being in the courts’ sensitivity to an ordinary per-
son’s concerns, t(349) = 2.91, p < .01. A full list of performance ratings and differences can be 
found in Table 5. Years working for courts and age were only significant predictors of judge 
and court performance for judge respondents. Specifically, the older a judge was, the more 
likely he or she was to give higher ratings to the statements, “Judges are generally honest and 
fair in deciding cases” (r = .212, p < .05), “Courts protect defendants’ constitutional rights” (r = 
.195, p < .05), “Most juries are representative of the community” (r = .242, p < .01), “Courts are 
not out of touch with what’s going on in their communities” (r = .179, p < .05), and “Courts are 
unbiased in their case decisions” (r = .195, p = .05). 
To understand whether the difference scores between participant perceptions of how the 
ten principles are currently used and how they should be used were related to the confidence 
judges and administrators have in the ability of courts to fulfill critical roles, we correlated re-
spondents’ confidence responses with the mean of their difference scores. The mean of all ten 
difference scores was used because, as described above, all scores were significant in the same 
negative direction. The results showed that the greater the gap between “is” and “should,” the 
Table 5. Perceptions of Confidence and Court Performance
Area of Performance                                                                                             Judges         Administrators         All
Your confidence in the courts of your state.**  5.74  5.40  5.54
Most judges in my state . . .
Do their job well.*  5.90  5.67  5.77
Treat people with respect.*  5.82  5.60  5.69
Treat some people better than others.  4.55  4.40  4.46
Generally honest and fair in deciding cases.  6.07  5.93  5.99
Do not give adequate attention and time to each individual case.  4.43  4.20  4.30
The courts in my state . . .
Protect defendants’ constitutional rights.  6.03  6.00  6.01
Are not out of touch with what’s going on in their 5.24  4.73  4.95
   communities.**
Make sure their orders are enforced.*  4.69  4.33  4.48
Treat people with dignity and respect.*  5.83  5.60  5.69
Are unbiased in their case decisions.  5.75  5.55  5.63
Listen carefully to what people have to say.**  5.49  5.16  5.30
Are sensitive to the concerns of ordinary people.**  5.53  5.14  5.30
Take peoples’ needs into account.**  5.35  5.00  5.14
Most juries are representative of the community.  5.46  5.29  5.36
Ratings range from 1 to 7, with higher numbers indicating stronger agreement to each statement. Bolded areas 
are significantly different between judges and administrators. *p < .05, **p < .01.
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lower participants rated confidence in their own court system (r = −.23, p < .001). This finding 
suggests that greater gaps in perceptions between the current operations of the courts in re-
lation to the ideal operations of the courts are related to decreased levels of confidence in the 
ability of the courts to do their jobs. This finding that the size of the gap predicts confidence 
provides reassurance that the ten principles are tapping dimensions that matter to the per-
ceived legitimacy of the courts among those who work in them. 
 
Discussion 
 
The Durham/Becker Principles 
 
From the analyses presented above, a number of points related to the court governance 
principles become clear. First, there appear to be significant gaps in the perceptions of judges 
and court administrators regarding the ways in which courts currently do work and how they 
should work. This appears to be particularly true in relation to court control over budgetary 
issues, where respondents generally disagreed with the notion that courts currently have suf-
ficient control over budget issues in relation to their attitudes about the ideal amount of con-
trol courts should have over the budget. Some, but not all, of these differences can be seen as 
reflecting the respective work issues faced by each group. 
Second, the evidence suggests that while court administrators view court management 
structure as most important, judges appear to view court budgetary issues as the most critical 
for effective delivery of justice into the future. 
Third, both judges and court administrators tend to view the centralization of court admin-
istration in a similar way. While there were statistical differences between the two groups on 
various aspects of court operations, both groups agreed that judicial assignments, human re-
sources, and the selection of trial court presiding judges are best performed at a local level, while 
legislative liaison, research, and major policy decisions are best conducted at the state level. Fi-
nally, we found that greater gaps in perceptions between the current and ideal operations of 
the courts were related to decreased levels of confidence in the ability of the courts to do their 
jobs. This finding has important implications for the future of court administration, as it shows 
that members of the judicial branch may feel they are in a position of relative impotence when 
they do not have the tools and resources available to administer justice in their courts effec-
tively. Fair, efficient, and equitable procedures are just as important for those who work in the 
court system as for “consumers” of the courts such as litigants (Burke and Leben 2008). In the 
end, it is important to recognize that while court personnel may have strong opinions regard-
ing the ways in which courts should operate, there are varying levels of opportunity at the 
state level to make this happen. In other words, the implementation of reforms in line with the 
ten principles will be somewhat dependent on the political cultures and the institutional ar-
rangements that exist in each state. 
 
Underlying Issues 
 
Stepping back from the specific findings, this survey of judges and court administrators 
provides insights into several major issues that state and local court leaders are talking about 
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but for which little data are available. The size of the survey sample and relatively low re-
sponse rate require caution in generalizing the findings, but court leaders should consider 
the following points. 
One fundamental issue is what the objectives of court reform under current circumstances 
should be. The ten principles included in the survey offer the start of an answer. There was sig-
nificant support for implementing all ten of the principles put forward by Durham and Becker 
(2010). All were viewed as desirable, although enthusiasm for “speaking with a single voice” was 
at a lower level than for the others. Support for the principles came equally from judges and from 
court administrators. The appropriateness of the principles as objectives for reform is also indi-
cated by the statistically significant degree to which survey respondents viewed all of the prin-
ciples as being insufficiently reflected in their state’s courts’ current practices. Moreover, there 
is evidence internal to the survey that the ten principles truly matter to people working in the 
courts. Their confidence in their court system is related to the size of the gap between the current 
and desired degree to which principles have been implemented. To a statistically significant de-
gree, the larger the gap perceived between the current and the desired level of the principles’ im-
plementation, the lower the respondents’ level of confidence in their state’s courts. 
Of course, had other governance principles been put forward in the survey, they may well 
have attracted as much or even higher levels of support from the survey respondents. But, 
based on the available evidence, it seems reasonable to treat the ten principles as a first draft 
of a reform agenda. Priorities could be set in that agenda based on the level of desirability each 
principle attracted and the size of the gap between the current and desired level to which a 
principle is being used. 
A second issue for which no other directly relevant source of data exists is whether support 
remains for renewing the agenda of court reform through unification. The survey finds no con-
sensus among judges or administrators that court functions are best carried out by a central 
administration. There also is no apparent preference for reverting back to the period in which 
local court governance prevailed. Instead, the survey responses suggest support for a gover-
nance model in which leadership is shared, with some functions best located locally at the in-
dividual trial court, whereas others would benefit from being centrally located. Most judges 
and administrators who participated in the survey preferred a model that might be described 
as one of shared leadership, an approach now being advocated by other members of the Exec-
utive Session (e.g., McQueen 2013; Mundell and Jefferson 2012). While this may seem a matter 
of common sense, the findings challenge some longstanding beliefs in the court world about 
how state court systems operate most effectively (e.g., ABA Standards Relating to Court Orga-
nization 1974/1990; Vanderbilt 1950). Moreover, the survey did not reveal a clear set of prefer-
ences as to which functions would best be performed centrally and which locally, with judges 
and court administrators differing to some extent but with a significant proportion of all re-
spondents indicating that either level would be acceptable. 
That lack of consensus is likely to prove troublesome in many—perhaps all—states. Any 
durable division of functional responsibilities between the local and state levels will need to be 
negotiated within each state. Unless intrastate differences on that division are relatively small, 
the process is likely to prove highly contentious, creating divisions in a state at a time when 
working toward a common purpose is vital. The old principles of court reform left most state 
court systems without a decision-making mechanism that could conduct the necessary nego-
tiations and make final decisions that would be viewed as legitimate at the trial court level. 
Although most states have some form of committee or council that is convened to include the 
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interests of trial judges and administrators in the decision-making process, with few excep-
tions they are purely advisory. Moreover, in nearly all states the trial court-level representa-
tives on central decision-making bodies are selected by the chief justice or the state supreme 
court as a whole. As a result, these central decision-making bodies, even when they have real 
decision-making authority, lack legitimacy in the eyes of the trial bench and trial court admin-
istrators. A renewed effort to build genuinely representative state judicial councils is impera-
tive (Mundell and Jefferson 2012). 
Finally, our analysis provides important validation for Durham and Becker’s (2010) choice 
of governance principles. That is fortunate because those principles are receiving extensive 
consideration not only by national organizations but also by individual state court systems 
and local trial courts engaged in reform efforts.7 The principles merit the attention they are 
receiving. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our objectives in analyzing the 2010 survey were twofold. First, we sought to test reactions 
to Durham and Becker’s ten principles for court governance. Second, we sought to use the 
survey as a basis for offering a contemporary assessment on where the court reform agenda 
stands based on the views of both judges and administrators. Our assessment included an-
swering three specific questions outlined at the start of this article: First, there is clear evidence 
that judges and court administrators are not content with the current manner in which their 
court system is governed. Specifically, they perceive a gap between the Durham and Becker 
principles, which they generally endorse, and the degree to which those principles are evi-
dent in their court system, a gap they would like to close. Second, there also is no clear con-
sensus on the respective roles of local court administration and centralized administration. 
Some functions that have been assumed to be increasingly viewed as a central task remain to 
many as best accomplished at the local level. Reaching at least broad agreement on how these 
roles should be allocated is an immediate challenge to any state considering court reform, and 
it is critical if the central authority is to be afforded legitimacy by those at the trial court level. 
Third, the challenge of governing state courts looks somewhat different for judges than for 
court administrators, with the difference greater for some functions, such as authority to al-
locate resources. Finally, there are “generational” differences, in which more newly minted 
judges and administrators seem more eager for change. 
7. As of August 2013, presentations based on “the principles” by one of the authors have been made at meetings of national 
organizations including the National Association for Court Management (2012), the Conference of Court Public Informa-
tion Officers (2013), and the Conference of (State) Chief Justices (2012). Equally important, several states already have or 
are using the paper (and the paper’s authors) as resources in rethinking their organization and management system. The 
National Center for State Courts has received over 700 requests for print copies of the paper (records on file with the au-
thors). The paper has formed the core of efforts in individual states to rethink their governance model in states like Mas-
sachusetts and Washington. The Bureau of Justice Assistance and the State Justice Institute have jointly funded a series 
of implementation projects based on ideas stemming from the Executive Session program to implement these and other 
proposals stemming from the Executive Session process. 
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